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The Current Legal Framework of the Use
of Force against Terrorist Organizations
Petra PERISIC1
Abstract: Events that took place on 9/11, when symbols of American nation were destroyed by
hijacked civilian airplanes, raised the issue of the effectiveness of the currently existing legal
framework which regulates terrorist activities. Prior to that event, dealing with terrorist activities was
mostly regulated by conventions, many of which were ratified by no more than couple of states.
However, it became questionable whether these instruments are sufficient to fight terrorists who are
not only immune to a threat of sanctions, but are even ready to sacrifice their lives. After the attacks
took place, the United States launched against Afghanistan an armed action, ending up in a more than
a decade long occupation, holding Taliban regime responsible for the attacks undertaken by Al-Qaida.
The United States response to the 9/11 raised an important question: what is the legal response to
terrorist attacks? This article explores the current legal framework of the use of force in response to
terrorist attacks, especially with regard to distinguishing terrorist acts which are attributable to a
certain state, from those which are undertaken by a terrorist group, not associated with any particular
state.
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1. Introduction
Invisibility and unpredictability of terrorist acts make terrorism one of the greatest
fears of practically every state, especially those which have a history of combating
terrorism on their soil. Terrorism, as a means of acquiring mostly religious,
political and ideological goals, is no novelty in the modern age. But in spite of the
fact that terrorism represents a serious and a long-existing problem in international
community, it seems that international law rules do not address it in a satisfactory
manner. Attempts have been made, but the lack of consensus among states has
resulted in many issues on terrorism remaining open.
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To begin with, there is no agreed definition on terrorism. Although it would appear
that attempts to define terrorism are useless because real-life situations usually
leave no doubt on whether a certain act is a terrorist one or not, the UN General
Assembly found it useful to determine the parameters that would qualify an act as
an act of terrorism, so to make the fight against terrorism more efficient.1 The task
of defining terrorism was given to the Six Committee of the General Assembly,
which, however, failed to draft such a definition. Subsequently, an ad hoc
committee under the umbrella of the General Assembly was established. It was
successful in drafting the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, which defined terrorism as any act which constitutes an
offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the existing treaties dealing
with issues of terrorism,2 or any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities
in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.3 Although such a
determination of terrorism does not actually represent a definition, this has so far
been the greatest achievement in defining terrorism. It has been asserted that a
number of states felt discomfort in attempts to define terrorism. Setting fixed
parameters according to which an act of terrorism could be detected would lead to
applying equal standards for all, meaning that certain acts of states, which are
undertaken on allegedly legitimate grounds, could be considered as acts of
terrorism. (Saura, 2003-2004, p. 13)
Another disputable question was the one concerning legal response of states to
terrorist acts. Many international conventions were adopted in the II half of the 20th
century with the aim of combating terrorism. However, their adoption appeared to
1 GA Res. 42/159.
2 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic
Agents, 1973; International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979; Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1988; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988; Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf,
1988; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997.
3 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Retrieved from:
http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm.
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be insufficient for the efficient fight against terrorists, having in mind difficulties
with locating terrorist infrastructure, inability to predict terrorist attacks and
radicalism of terrorists, due to which they are not only immune to the threat of
sanctions, but are even ready to risk their own lives to promote their ideas.
Even though terrorist attacks took place relatively often in different parts of the
world, it was the horrible 9/11 attack that revived the debate about the legal
mechanisms of fight against international terrorism. Being conducted by a non-
state actor, but attributed by the United States to the state of Afghanistan on the
grounds of harboring terrorists, the 9/11 attack caused an armed intervention
undertaken by the United States against Afghanistan. Although the action was to an
extent tolerated by the international community, it was of dubious legality. The
action, which was allegedly undertaken on the grounds of self-defense, ended up in
a more than a decade long occupation of the Afghan territory, bringing into
question practically all three requirements of the legitimate self-defense:
immediacy, necessity and proportionality.
It was mostly the United States intervention in Afghanistan, but also other
instances of the use of force, such as those undertaken by Israel against
neighboring states allegedly harboring terrorists, that gave rise to the question of
how to deal with the attacks emanating from terrorist groups. Special attention has
been given to differentiating situations in which terrorists act on their own, from
the situations of the state-sponsored terrorism. In this regard, international law
rules governing attribution of acts to states have to be examined.
2. Can Terrorist Attack be subsumed under the Meaning of an “Armed
Attack” from Article 51 of the UN Charter?
The United Nations Charter in its Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force
which is directed against territorial integrity or political independence of any state
or which is in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations, providing for only one exception to the prohibition of the
unilateral use of force – the right of self-defense, in Article 51 of the Charter.1 The
1 Article 51 provides: „Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
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provision of Article 51 does not introduce a new right of states, but rather confirms
a right that has already existed in customary law. However, it introduces it with
certain additional requirements. Firstly, in light of the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security given by the Charter to the
Security Council,1 Article 51 obliges states to immediately inform the Security
Council on undertaking of self-defense, as well as not to prejudice the authority of
the Security Council in taking at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security. And secondly, it
conditions the possibility of undertaking self-defense with the prior emergence of
an unlawful armed attack.
In the customary law right to self-defense, which existed prior to the adoption of
the Charter, there was no requirement that unlawful armed attacked be committed
in order to trigger the right to self-defense. This meant that the state could have
undertaken self-defense even in the anticipation of an armed attack, that is, prior to
its actual occurrence. Since the emergence of an “armed attack” requirement
represented a novelty in the Charter, but in customary law as well, as the adoption
of the Charter reflected the opinio juris of practically entire international
community, the meaning and the scope of the term “armed attack” had to be
established.
No definition of an armed attack exists, either in the Charter or in any other
international law document. It, therefore, became the subject of different
interpretations. While some believed that it has to be an attack of a serious gravity,
(Mrazek, 1989, p. 109), other believed that a single trans-border bullet could
constitute an armed attack (Dinstein, 2005, p. 182). In discussing a threshold for
determining an armed attack, the International Court of Justice found in its
Nicaragua judgment that “the most grave forms of the use of force” constitute an
armed attack, while those less grave do not.2 The Court has endorsed its reasoning
from the Nicaragua judgment in its more recent decision on Oil Platforms.3
With regard to criteria established by the International Court of Justice concerning
the gravity of the attack, it might be concluded that terrorist attack should, as all the
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.”
1 Article 24 of the Charter.
2 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 101.
3 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003,
p. 187.
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other armed attacks, undergo a case-by-case evaluation in determining the gravity
of the attack. However, the gravity of the attack should not be taken as the only
parameter in identifying an armed attack as a basis for undertaking self-defense.
Another question yet has to be answered – who does the attack have to come from.
Article 51 is silent on the question of who does the attack has to come from in
order to constitute an armed attack and give rise to the right to self-defense.
Traditionally, it has been considered that such an attack has to come from a state
and not from a non-state actor. Presumably, the drafters of the Charter did have in
mind an attack coming from a state, since at the time of the adoption of the Charter
states indeed were the only international law subjects capable of undertaking such
an attack. In recent times, especially after the 9/11 attacks, those not inclined to this
traditional understanding of an armed attack claimed that the general idea behind
the Article 51 of the Charter is to provide to states a protection against an attack,
regardless of who it comes from.1
Although states should be given the opportunity to defend themselves in an
effective manner against the attacks emanating from non-states actors, allowing the
possibility of self-defense against non-state actors opens a debate on several crucial
issues. Firstly, the still very much debated issue of the international legal
personality of non-state actors should have to be resolved. And secondly, there
should be a way to reconcile a struggle against terrorists with respecting other
states’ sovereignty. Although terrorists operate through networks not associated
with exclusively one state, they are nevertheless bound to a certain territory. For
this reason, it is practically impossible to use military force against terrorists and
not violate a certain state’s sovereignty at the same time.
For the time being, the majority opinion is that an attack must come from a state in
order to be considered an armed attack in the context of Article 51. The
International Court of Justice has confirmed such a standpoint in several decisions
and advisory opinions. In its Nicaragua judgment, the Court found that an armed
attack means an action by regular armed forces across an international border, but
also the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its
substantial involvement therein.2 By ruling in this manner, the Court limited the
1 See: Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, p. 1063.
2 ICJ Reports 1986 (note 27), p. 103.
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possibility of undertaking armed attacks to states. The same conclusion was
reached in the advisory opinion on the Israeli Wall, in which the Court said that
Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-
defense in the case of armed attack by one state against another state.1 Finally, in
its most recent decision on the subject, in the Armed Activities judgment, the Court
found that Uganda was not entitled to act in self-defense because the attacks
against Uganda did not emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo or acting on behalf of the Congo.2 The Court
has, thus, embraced the traditional view, according to which an attack has to come
from the state in order to be considered an armed attack and to give rise to the right
of self-defense. Since the decisions in which the Court ruled in this manner are
relatively recent, it can reasonably be expected that the Court would employ the
same standard in future cases involving the issue of self-defense.
3. The Issue of Attribution of Terrorist Acts to States
Having determined that terrorist acts must come from the state in order to give rise
to the right of self-defense, it must be established which acts are attributable to the
state, triggering thus its international responsibility.
According to Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, “the conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that
state under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive,
judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the
State and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a
territorial unit of the state.”3 This goes for situations in which a person is acting as
a de jure organ of a state. Situations such as these are in principle not disputable –
an act of such a person would be considered as an act of the state itself, forming
thus the so-called state-sponsored terrorism. Such situations are in practice very
rare.
1 Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 194.
2 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 222-223.
3 Article 4, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries (2001).
Retrieved from http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
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There can also be a situation in which a person which commits a terrorist act is not
a de jure, but rather a de facto organ of the state. These are usually acts of
individuals, mostly physical persons, who do not normally posses any state
authority, but in some specific situations they might be acting under direction or in
the interest of the state concerned (Kittrich, 2009, p. 137). In this respect, it is
important to outline Article 8 of the Draft Articles, which provides that “the
conduct of a person or a group of persons shall be considered an act of a State
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the
conduct”. There has been a discussion on the degree of control of a state over an
individual in order to attribute his acts to a state. Judicial bodies did not seem to
establish unified criteria in determining a degree of such a control. In the
Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice established the test of an
effective control of a state over groups or individuals. The Court found that self-
defense may in certain circumstances be undertaken in response to attacks
committed by non-state actors, however it is an imperative that these attacks are of
sufficient gravity and that the state from which non-state actors operate is
significantly involved.1 The Court confirmed the effective control test established
in the Nicaragua case in its relatively recent judgment on the Bosnian Genocide.2
On the other hand, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
did not set such a high standard for the state involvement. The Appeals Chamber of
the Tribunal ruled in the Tadic case that in order to attribute the acts of a military
or paramilitary group to a state, it must be proved that the state wields overall
control over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but also by
coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity.
It is, however, not necessary that the state should also issue, either to the head or to
members of the group, instructions for the commission of specific acts contrary to
international law.3 The Tribunal does not require such a close connection between
the state and the groups conducting terrorist activities as was required in the
Nicaragua judgment. It must be noted though that the Tribunal has gone into
establishing the standards for attribution of acts to states, which is the question
1 ICJ Reports 1986 (note 27), p. 65.
2 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ Reports 2007, p. 209-210.
3 Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY, Case IT-94-1-A (1999), International Legal Materials, vol. 38, nr. 6,
para. 131, 145.
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beyond its discretion. Its mandate is to deal with issues of individual criminal
responsibility, not with those of state responsibility.
Regardless of the stricter attitude towards a state responsibility of the ICTY in
comparison with the International Court of Justice, even the ICTY stated that the
degree of control should exceed the mere financing and equipping of such forces
and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of military
operations.1 This finding is significant with respect to recent developments in the
sphere of “war on terror”, since there have been contentions that the state bears
international responsibility solely for harboring terrorists on its soil. Ever since the
9/11 attacks took place, attempts to broaden the state responsibility by attributing a
wide variety of acts to states have been present. The question arose of whether the
9/11 events had an influence on changing international law in sense of
reinterpreting the meaning of an armed attack, self-defense and the position of non-
state actors.
4. The Impact of 9/11 Attacks on International Law
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks there has been a strong impulse by the part of the
international community to extend the right to self-defense to non-state actors,
regardless of the international responsibility of the state from which they operate.
In fact, it has been maintained that international responsibility of these states does
exist due to the fact that they are harboring terrorists. Such contentions are
problematic in sense that they are not compatible with the international law rules
regulating state responsibility.
A year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration issued The National
Security Strategy of the United States of America, in which the United States
announced the struggle against terrorism and put forward the idea of the necessity
of preemptive actions against terrorists. This act represents a formal confirmation
of the American policy of preventive use of force in conducting the so-called “war
on terror”. The relevant part of the Document reads: “The enemy is not a single
political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism…We
make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide
aid to them.”2 By equating terrorists with states which harbor them, the United
1 Ibid., para.145.
2 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002). Retrieved
from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
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States attribute the responsibility for the terrorist acts to states, regardless of the
involvement of a certain state in these activities.
It is undisputed that after the 9/11 attacks several states and international
organizations spoke in favor of undertaking self-defense as a response to terrorist
attacks. Right after the attacks, the North Atlantic Council has concluded that any
attack directed against the United States from abroad shall be covered by the
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,1 according to which an armed attack against
one or more of the states parties in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack
occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the Party
or Parties so attacked.2 Article 5 of the Treaty mentions an armed attack in the
context of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the right of self-defense
(Dinstein, 2005, p. 208). Also, following the attacks, there was a meeting of
foreign ministers in the Organization of American States, where it was concluded
that terrorist attack against the United States represents a terrorist attack against all
of the American states.3
Special attention has been paid to two resolutions by which the Security Council
addressed the 9/11 attacks. Both resolutions confirmed the right of individual and
collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter.4 There was no explicit
mention of an armed attack in the context of terrorist attacks, however the mention
of the right to self-defense points to the possibility of admitting such a status to
terrorist acts (Drumbl, 2002-2003, p. 29). Yet, it has been agreed by many that the
Security Council resolutions were formulated in an inconclusive manner. Since the
Security Council acknowledged, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
existence of the threat to international peace and security, it could have authorized
states to conduct a military action. However, no such authorization has been given.
Instead, the Security Council confirmed the right to self-defense – a right which is
inherent to states and which does not need to be confirmed by the Security Council
if the prerequisites for its undertaking are fulfilled. It thus appears that these
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Statement by the North Atlantic Treaty Council, International
Legal Materials, vol. 40, nr. 5, 2001, p. 1267.
2 The North Atlantic Treaty (1949). Retrieved from
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
3 Organization of American States: Resolution on Terrorist Threat to the Americas, International
Legal Materials, vol. 40, nr. 5, 2001, p. 1273.
4 SC Res. 1368 (2001); SC Res. 1373 (2001).
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resolutions were more of a shocking reaction to 9/11 attack than an elaborated
attitude towards the acts of non-state actors.
The question of the status of no-state actors requires the answer on their
international legal personality. With certain exceptions, the main subjects in
international law are states and international organizations. Recently, there have
been attempts to grant a status of international law subjects to certain groups and
even to individuals. The rationale behind such tendencies is the following: it would
be irreconcilable with the modern concept of international law and international
security if states were bound by the international prohibition to use force, whereas
international criminal and terrorist networks and organizations, which are capable
of and willing to use military weapons, including weapons of mass destruction,
against military, political, economic and purely civilian targets, would “only” be
subject to criminal law (Krajewski, 2005, p. 22). This standing certainly holds true
in certain respect, however the issue of international legal personality of non-state
actors is far from being resolved. Even the proponents of such an idea are very
cautious in asserting the existence of international legal capacity of non-state
actors.
Finally, granting the right to self-defence against non-state actors is problematic
from the perspective of the preserving the state sovereignty. A military action
against a terrorist organization located on the territory of a particular state is at the
same time an action violating that state’s sovereignty. In an attempt to overcome
this problem, the United States have introduced a theory, according to which there
is an international responsibility of the state solely because it allows the presence
of terrorist groups on its territory. It is a well known principle of international law
that states have an obligation not to allow knowingly their territory to be used for
acts in a manner contrary to the rights of other states.1 However, the breach of such
an international obligation does not mean that the state has committed an indirect
aggression, as some states and legal writers are trying to prove. It is unlikely that
terrorist acts, which are principally sporadic acts of violence, can be regarded as
aggression. If we look at the Definition of Aggression, adopted in 1974 by the
General Assembly, tolerating the presence of terrorist groups on its territory would
not fall within the scope of indirect aggression.2
1 Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment of April 9, 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p.
22.
2 Definition of Aggression (1974). Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/739/16/IMG/NR073916.pdf?OpenElement.
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It seems that many questions regarding the potential international legal personality
of non-state actors, as well as the ability of states to undertake self-defense against
them, have remained unresolved. It is the United States and its traditional allies that
encourage this concept, but the rest of the international community, although aware
of the sensitiveness of the issue and the danger of terrorist activity, has not
endorsed this expanded notion of self-defense. As was pointed out earlier, even the
International Court of Justice, as the most authoritative interpreter of international
law rules, has not changed its position on this point after the 9/11 attacks. In its
judgment and advisory opinion from 2004 and 2005 it repeated its reasoning from
the Nicaragua judgment, according to which self-defense can be undertaken
against the state only.
5. Conclusion
If we conclude that self-defense is permissible only against states, the question that
poses itself is how to fight against terrorist organization, if their conduct is not
attributable to a certain state.
Some have proposed to invoke the state of necessity as a legal ground for using
military force against such organizations. According to Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, necessity may be
invoked by a state as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in
conformity with an international obligation of that state if the act is the only way
for the state to safeguard its essential interests against grave and imminent peril.1 It
would be quite a convenient ground for undertaking actions against terrorists, for
the action in that case would not be directed against the host state as such, but
merely against terrorist infrastructure. Neutralizing terrorist activities by using
armed force would almost perfectly describe the state of necessity, were it not for
the Article 26 of the Draft Articles, which says that nothing (meaning not even the
necessity) can preclude the wrongfulness of any act of state which is not in
conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general
international law. Since the prohibition of the use of force is a peremptory norm of
international law, it is much disputed in the legal doctrine whether necessity can
serve as a legal ground in this case.
1 Article 25 of the Draft Articles.
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This leaves us with the conclusion that it is only the Security Council authorization
that can provide a legal basis for using military force against terrorist groups.
Based on its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council can, when it determines the
existence of the threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,
authorize the use of force against terrorists. It is very well known that the
functioning of the Security Council is often not satisfactory. Even though the right
of veto was supposed to serve as a guarantee of a fair decision-making, it turned
out to be an obstacle for the efficient functioning of the Council. In this regard, the
need for reforming the Security Council in order for it to function better than now
is a question for a serious debate. Finding mechanisms for strengthening the
responsibility of the Council members is of great importance.
In case of failure of the Security Council to act in situations of terrorist attack,
states can always take measures in accordance with their national law. Even though
some states claim that these measures are not sufficient to fight terrorists, actions
including the unilateral use of force have not proved to be too efficient either. The
United States responded to 9/11 attacks by attacking Afghanistan allegedly in self-
defense. The action developed into a more than a decade long occupation of
Afghanistan. If one could have been persuaded at the beginning of the action that it
did constitute self-defense, as time passed by, it became more and more obvious
that it did not fulfill the requirements for the legitimate self-defense. After such an
intense armed action, the terrorist activity in Afghanistan is still very high and the
alleged purpose of the United States action was not fulfilled. It has especially
proved to be useless to try to change a regime in a particular country by an outside
intervention because each society has to go through its own way of democratization
and dealing with its internal problems, including neutralizing terrorist activity on
its territory.
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